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Abstract
The focus of the present paper is on the intragenerational eﬀects
of nonlinear income taxation in a multiperiod framework. We inves-
tigate whether it is possible to achieve redistribution at smaller eﬃ-
ciency costs by enlarging the message space adopted in standard tax
system (which only includes reported income) to consider also the age
of taxpayers. Since it would be awkward to analyze an age related tax
without taking into account the time-dimension, we use an intertem-
poral extension of the Stiglitz-Stern (1982, 1982) discrete adaptation
of the Mirrlees (1971) optimal income taxation model. In the simplest
version of the model we neglect the possibility of savings. This case
can be interpreted as a situation with extreme liquidity constraints. It
is shown that switching to an age related tax system opens the way
for a Pareto improving tax reform entailing a cut in marginal tax rates
for young agents. In a second version of the model we retain the possi-
bility of savings and, assuming that the policy maker can tax interest
incomes on a linear scale, we also analyze the optimal values of the in-
terest income tax rate for the age dependent and the age independent
tax systems.
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02 58365318.1 Introduction
Many countries have ambitious redistributional goals implying high marginal
income tax rates and ineﬃciencies. There is therefore a continuous ongoing
search for taxes that can achieve redistribution with smaller eﬃciency losses.
Akerlof (1978) pointed out that if the tax system can be diﬀerentiated be-
tween individuals according to some characteristic correlated with ability,
then there is a potential for reducing the conﬂict between redistribution and
eﬃciency.1 Since in most countries average income varies systematically
with age, in this paper we will investig a t ei fi ti sp o s s i b l et oa c h i e v er e d i s -
tribution at smaller eﬃciency costs by relating the tax payments to the age
of persons.2
The design of the tax system will depend on the objective of the social
planner. There is a strong case for age dependent taxes if the social planner is
concerned with annual utilities. If skill level and age covary perfectly, an age
tax could in this case achieve the ﬁrst best. However, if the social planner
is concerned with lifetime utilities, then, if age and skill covary perfectly,
individuals have identical income paths and no redistribution is needed. If
there is no covariation, there will be no gains either. In the intermediate
case, with some covariation, there might be a role for an age related tax. In
this paper we will be concerned with this latter case.
When designing a model to analyze the potential beneﬁts of an age de-
pendent income tax there are several important modelling choices. Perhaps
the most fundamental is whether to use an atemporal or an intertempo-
ral model. In our view it would be awkward to analyze an age dependent
tax without taking into account that age has a time-dimension. Individuals
use intertemporal reallocations of consumption possibilities and, as we will
see, this savings behavior has important implications for how the tax sys-
tem should be designed. We therefore adopt an intertemporal model where
individuals can save.
As a vehicle for our analysis we will use an extension of the Stiglitz-Stern
(1982, 1982) simpliﬁed “two-types” version of the Mirrlees (1971) optimal
income taxation model. We construct an overlapping generations model with
individuals living for two periods and facing a consumption-leisure choice in
1The argument is straightforward: we know that, equity and feasibility aside, the
best tax is a lump-sum tax; therefore, if the government is engaged in redistribution
but cannot observe ability directly, eﬃciency is maximized by taxing objects which the
individual cannot aﬀect (or activities that go on the same regardless of the tax) and which
are correlated with the skill level.
2This in turn raises the question of horizontal equity; Picard (2001) provides a recent
example where it is claimed that in the income taxation literature the choice of the control
variables is restricted by horizontal equity and that the design of income tax based on age
is considered not ethical. On the other way, the relevance of the concept of horizontal
equity for normative purposes has recently been questioned in a series of articles by Kaplow
(1989, 1995, 2000) and Kaplow and Shavell (2000, 2001).
1each period. All individuals are low skilled in the ﬁrst period of life. In
the second period the proportion πll stays low skilled and the proportion
πlh becomes high skilled. This means that individuals have diﬀerent income
paths and we would like to redistribute from the lh to the ll individuals.
Ideally in this situation we would like to tax some index of lifetime income.
However, real-life tax systems exclusively use annual income as tax base.
We therefore impose the restriction in our analysis that annual income is
the tax base. Hence, the social planner is concerned with lifetime utilities
but can only use taxes imposed on annual income.
We will consider the design of the tax system under various observational
assumptions. The ﬁrst tax system that we consider is such that the social
planner knows the joint age-skill distribution but is restricted to oﬀer the
same (labor income, disposable income)-bundle to all agents of a given skill
level, irrespective of their age. Two income points are designed; one intended
for the low skilled and another intended for the high skilled. The second tax
system is designed under the assumption that the social planner, knowing
the mechanism that some low skilled persons become high skilled in the
second period, attempts to design three income points: one for young low
skilled persons, another for old low skilled persons and a third for (old) high
skilled persons. However, it is assumed that the planner cannot observe the
age of individuals. Depending on the assumptions we make with regard to
the individual preferences, the tax system will in one case collapse to a two
points system, while in another case three points will be used. Finally, in
the third tax system the assumption of non-observability of age is removed
and the planner designs three income points.
There are many studies using an OLG model with a homogeneous pop-
ulation and no intragenerational redistribution. These models often focus
on growth related issues. In this paper we focus on the intragenerational
redistributive eﬀects of income taxation in a multiperiod framework. This
complicates the model. To keep the analysis manageable we simplify and
completely abstract from all growth related issues. To illustrate the basic
workings of our model, in its simplest version we also abstract from savings.
Since in our model a likely case is that where individuals would like to bor-
row in the ﬁrst period of life, the no savings case can also be interpreted as
a situation with extreme liquidity constraints.
There are also some studies using an OLG model with heterogeneous
skill levels (Brett (1998), Pirttilä and Tuomala (1998)). These articles diﬀer
from our paper as they focus on the division of life into a working period and
a retirement period. In our model we focus on the fact that individuals have
diﬀerent income paths and that inequality widens with the age of cohorts.
The possibility of lump-sum taxation with some redistributive power
has earlier been discussed by, for example, Hahn (1973), Akerlof (1978) and
Viard (2001). In his concluding remarks Hahn (1973) argues that lump
sum taxes are available. However, the examples he gives of lump sum taxes
2used in the past seem of little relevance for taxation today. Akerlof (1978)
discusses how the tax-transfer system can be made more eﬃcient if a “needy
group” can be identiﬁed, tagged, and given a tax-transfer system of its
own. This idea is also pursued in Immonen et al. (1998). Kremer (2002)
investigates the conditions under which an age dependent income tax might
be beneﬁcial. However, he considers the case where annual, and not lifetime,
utilities enter the social welfare function. Kremer presents empirical data
that support the idea that an age dependent income tax would be of value.
The idea of making the income tax age dependent has also been suggested
in a recent article in Fortune by Mankiw (1998).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model in
its general form. Section 3 deals with the simpliﬁed case where there are
no opportunities to save. We show how observability of age allows a Pareto
improvement upon an optimal income tax system that does not condition
the tax on age. In Section 4 we assume access to the international capital
market, so that savings are possible and the problem of interest income
taxation is investigated. Section 5 provides some additional comments and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2T h e M o d e l
The economy is described by an OLG model where there is no population
growth, each cohort consists of a large number of individuals and its size is
normalized to one. All agents are low skilled (earning a unitary wage wl)
when “young” (in the ﬁrst period of life) and each agent faces an exogenous
probability πlh to become high skilled (earning a unitary wage wh)i nt h e
second period of his/her life; therefore, by the assumption of a large number
of households, the proportions of low- and high skilled individuals among
“old” people are given by πll =1− πlh and πlh respectively.
All agents are ex ante identical and derive utility from consumption when
young (cy) and consumption when old (co). Moreover, they get disutility
from labor supplied when young (Ly)a n dw h e no l d( Lo). Lifetime utility
is represented by the additive separable quasi-concave utility function U =
u(cy,L y)+ 1
1+ρu(co,L o), which is assumed to be identical across households
and where ρ is a rate of time preference.3 At the rate of interest r prevailing
in the credit market, agents are free to save (borrow) in the ﬁrst period of
their life in order to ﬁnance future (present) consumption. Labor income
(I = wL) is assumed to be taxed on a nonlinear scale through a general
income tax function T (I) and interest incomes (rs) on a linear scale through
a residence-based taxation at a proportional rate t (with full oﬀsets for net
interest paid). Production is linear and uses labor as the only factor.4
3Notice that preferences are constrained to be age-independent.
4Since interest income taxation can be interpreted as a special case of commodity
3The government’s problem is to maximize the ex post utility of those
who remain low skilled subject to the constraint of a minimum level of
utility to those who become high skilled, a set of incentive-compatibility
constraints, a balanced budget constraint and the resource constraint of
the economy.5 Notice that this implies that the objective function of the
government does not coincide with what young people actually maximize
(i.e. ex ante expected utility).6 This would not have been the case if we had
assumed the view that the policy maker was concerned with maximizing ex
ante expected utility (as for instance done by Cremer and Gahvari (1995))
or if we had assumed that people perfectly knew in the ﬁrst period of their
life what would have been their skill level in the second period.
Looking at the consumer’s behavior and denoting by B = I − T (I) the
after tax labor income, we have that the level of consumption in the second
period of life will be clh
o = s(1 + r(1 − t))+Blh
o for those who turn out to be
high skilled when old, and cll
o = s(1 + r(1 − t))+Bll
o for those who turn out
to remain low skilled. In the ﬁrst period of life the conditional demand for
savings of an expected utility maximizing agent can be written with obvious
notation as s = By − cy = s
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Combining (1) and (2), we have that the marginal income tax rate faced
by young people is implicitly given by
taxation, proportional interest income taxation can be justiﬁed by referring to the attempt
to limit the scope for arbitrage opportunities among agents (see Hammond (1987) for the
general theory of the desirability of linear pricing when commodities are exchangeable on
side markets, and Lindencrona (1993) for an application to the topic of taxation of capital
income).
5T h ep r e - s e tl e v e lo fu t i l i t yf o ra g e n t so ft y p elh will be hereafter selected in such a way
that redistribution goes from the high- to the low-wage households, what in literature is
referred to as the “normal” case.
6This circumstance explains also why at some points the standard way of addressing
















Since savings are given for old individuals, the marginal income tax rates










































It will be convenient to look by now in more details at the optimal level of
savings chosen by young agents. Having denoted by q the net rate of return
on savings (q = r(1 − t)), the second order condition that must be satisﬁed






Implicit diﬀerentiation of (1) gives the following comparative statics re-











































































The ﬁrst three inequalities follow from the assumption that cy is a nor-








o < (>)0if consumption and leisure are Edge-
worth substitutes (complements) in u. Finally, notice that the sign of (12)
will be unambiguously negative for a borrower, since for such an individual
income and substitution eﬀects push in the same direction, while it becomes
ambiguous for a lender, depending on the relative magnitudes of the substi-
tution eﬀect (negative) and the income eﬀect (positive).
3 The Model without Savings
In this Section we start the analysis with a simple framework where indi-
viduals cannot save. This proves to be a useful starting point since the
possibility to neglect the problem of savings and the related problem of the
optimal interest income tax simplify matters remarkably and allows us to get
sharp results. We also assume the productive technology is linear and uses
eﬀective labor as the only productive factor. Thus, the production function








3.1 Case 1: The Government Does not Try to Set up a Three
Points System
The ﬁr s tc a s ew ee x p l o r ei sw h e nt h eg o v e r n m e n tk n o w st h ej o i n td i s t r i b u t i o n
of skill and age but it doesn’t try to s e tu pat h r e ei n c o m ep o i n t ss y s t e m ,
i.e. it oﬀers the same (labor income, disposable income)-bundle to young
agents and old low skilled ones.
Denoting by V indirect utilities and by a “hat” a variable when referred













































6where V is a pre-set utility level and Lagrange multipliers are within
parentheses.7










































I = −θπlh (16)
Dividing (16) by (14) and using condition (5), we get the usual result of




∂Ih =0 , (17)
which here means that the labor/leisure choice of those who turn out to
be high skilled in the second period of their life should not be distorted at
the margin.
On the other hand, dividing (15) by (13), we have that young people and
those who remain low skilled in the second period of their life face a positive




















where the term inside brackets represents the diﬀerence between the
marginal valuation of leisure in terms of consumption for a low skilled agent
and a mimicker. Denoting by MRSI,B = − VI
VB the marginal rate of sub-











I,B − d MRSI,B
´
.
7Notice that the fact that the government knows the joint distribution of skill and age
aﬀects the way the set of participation constraints is shaped by determining the cardinality
of this set.
73.2 Case 2: Age is not Observable but the Government Tries
to Set up a Three Points System
The second case we consider is the one where, even if age is not directly
observable, the government tries to use the information on how skills are
distributed across age groups to set up a three income points system, i.e.
it tries to oﬀer three diﬀerent points in the (I,B)-space. In this case the














































≥ c V h (By,I y), (η)



























Together, constraints (φ)a n d( ϕ) imply that the utility that agents get
in the ﬁrst period of life must be equal to the utility obtained in the second
period of life by those who remain low skilled. Notice that this alone is not
suﬃcient to conclude that the level of consumption and labor supply of a
young agent is the same as the one of an old low skilled person. Moreover,
diﬀerent consumption-leisure bundles that are equally preferred by a low
skilled agent will be in general not indiﬀerent when evaluated by a high
skilled agent acting as a mimicker. However, it can be easily proved that an
optimum is only compatible with both the constraints (µ)a n d( η) binding at
the same time, which in turn means that not only the consumption-leisure
bundles for a young household and for an old low skilled one should lie on
8t h es a m ei n d i ﬀerence curve of a low skilled agent, but that those bundles
should also lie on the same indiﬀerence curve of a high skilled agent: by
single-crossing this can happen only if the two bundles are actually the
same bundle. Otherwise, a tax reform can be implemented that leaves each
agent at the same utility level and that at the same time generates additional
revenue to the government (see ﬁg. 2-5 in Appendix).
This means that the policy maker is actually oﬀering only two points in
the (I,B)-space and therefore we are back to case 1. Notice also that such a
result is due to the fact that, having assumed age-independent preferences
and ruling out the possibility of savings, at any given point in the (I,B)-
space the indiﬀerence curve for a young agent has the same slope as the one
for an old low skilled agent. In a more general context this property would
not hold and a policy maker would actually do better by trying to set up a
three income points system even if age were not observable.
3.3 Case 3: Age is Observable and the Government Tries to
Set up a Three Points System
Before presenting the analysis of the optimal income tax system, we show
how the observability of age allows to Pareto improve upon the optimal tax
system where age is not observable. Fig. 1 gives an example of a Pareto-
improving tax reform that could be implemented by conditioning the income
tax schedule to the age of individuals.
B
I
Figure 1: A Pareto improving tax reform
9The reform can be illustrated as follows. The two income points system
consists of points A and B. High skilled people are located at point A and
young and old low skilled are bunched at point B. The indiﬀerence curve
going through point A indicates the utility obtained for a high skilled person
in second period of life. The indiﬀerence curve going through points B and
C indicates the utility obtained by a low skilled person in ﬁrst period of
life. However, since the utility function for the second period is just the ﬁrst
period utility function multiplied by a positive number, it also represents
the indiﬀerence curve indicating the utility level obtained for a low skilled
person in second period of life (thus, there are two separate utility levels
represented by the same indiﬀerence curve). Given that the tax can be
conditioned on age a strict Pareto improvement can be obtained in the
following way. Oﬀer the young low skilled the point C, where they have the
same utility as at B. However, at point C their leisure-consumption choice is
undistorted. This implies that resources are released so that old low skilled
people can be located at point D, where they obtain a higher utility than
in the two income points system. In terms of lifetime utilities the expected
lifetime utility of individuals has gone up. The actual lifetime utility of
people being low skilled in both periods has increased whereas the lifetime
utility of those who are high skilled in the second period is unchanged. The
changes in consumption and work are as follows. The old high skilled would
perform as before. The young low skilled would work more, have higher
labor income and consume more. The old low skilled would work less and
also have less consumption.
We next consider the optimal tax. When the policy maker can observe
age and uses the information on the correlation between skill and age in






















































10where in writing the self-selection constraints we have used the property
that mimicking cannot occur between agents at diﬀerent points in their
lifetime.
The ﬁrst order conditions are the following:
By :( 1 + λ)V
y(l)







B = µc V h










B = θπlh (21)
Iy :( 1 + λ)V
y(l)







I = µc V h










I = −θπlh (24)
Again, dividing (24) by (21) and using condition (5), we have that the






In this case, however, also the income/tax point intended for the young
agents is not mimicked by anyone else. This implies that also the la-
bor/leisure choice of young households will not be distorted at the margin;




Finally, dividing (23) by (20) and using (4), we get the result that the



































Using the information on the correlation between skill and age is Pareto im-
proving only if age is directly observable. In the model without savings and
with age not directly observable, the information on the joint distribution of
skill and age would have been Pareto improving if we had assumed an age-
dependent utility function (assuming for instance that old people appreciate
leisure relatively more than young people).
114 The Model with Access to the International Cap-
ital Market
The productive technology is represented by the same function as before but,
since we allow for both borrowing and lending in the international capital








where r denotes the marginal productivity of capital K (gross rate of
return on savings).8,9
Combining the households’ budget constraints
cy = By − s
cl
o = Bl
o + s(1 + r) − trs
ch
o = Bh
o + s(1 + r) − trs
and the resource constraint
Iy + πllIl
o + πlhIh
o + s(1 + r)=cy + πllcl
o + πlhch
o + s,













+ rst =0 .
This implies that in the government’s problem we need to take into
account only one from the resource constraint and government budget con-
straint.
Before turning to the analysis of Pareto eﬃcient tax policies when the
government aims at maximizing actual lifetime utilities, it turns out to be
useful to make an intermediate step and deal with the case when the gov-
ernment maximizes the expected utility of agents subject to a self-selection
and a budget constraint. On one hand, since all individuals are identical
ex ante, this might appear as the natural concept of optimality one should
employ; on the other hand, as compared to the case when the government
looks at ex post lifetime utilities and engages in Pareto eﬃcient taxation, we
will see that things become simpler and neater results are obtained.
8Time indexes are suppressed since we are focusing on steady-state solutions.
9The model could also be interpreted as one of a closed economy where, besides labor,
it is also used another productive factor, namely capital. However, in this case, given the
model we set up, savings couldn’t be negative.
124.1 The Expected Utility Case with a “Two Points” System





































































































+(r − q)s(•)=0 . (θ)
Notice that in this problem, as compared to what happened in the case
without savings, the set of self-selection constraints is larger. In particular,
we have an additional self-selection constraint (the µ-constraint) requiring
that the lifetime expected utility of a mimicker must be lower or equal
to the one of a non-mimicker. Faced with the redistributive policy of the
government and anticipating that he/she might be high skilled in the second
period, a young agent could in fact be tempted to misrepresent his/her
type in the second period and therefore to adjust his/her savings behavior
in the ﬁrst period in order to maximize the gain achievable picking the
point intended for the low skilled agents. It is straightforward to show
that the µ-constraint will be the only binding self-selection constraint at
an optimum and therefore that the ξ-constraint can be neglected. Assume
for this purpose that the µ-constraint is satisﬁed. Then, since the level of
savings sm has been chosen optimally by the potential mimicker, it follows
13that no other level of savings (call it s∗) can guarantee him/her a higher
expected lifetime utility, which means:
u
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(1 + q)s∗ (•)+Bl,Il
´
.
Substituting for s∗ in the above inequality the value s chosen by a “fair”










































simplifying terms gives the ξ-constraint.
Denoting by a double “hat” the variables referred to the potential mim-
icker who turns out to be low skilled in the second period (i.e. the old low




































































10Notice that in the f.o.c. for the “two points system”, since the government is con-
strained to choose By = B
l
o = B
l as well as Iy = I
l
o = I













































































































Hereafter, we will denote the marginal rates of substitution between





































o); d d MRSI,c = −( ∂b b u
∂Il
o)/( ∂b b u
∂cl
o).
Notice that, besides three groups of “fair” agents (young, old low skilled
and old high skilled), we have young (low skilled) mimickers choosing in the
ﬁrst period the level of savings sm that maximizes the expected lifetime gain
from mimicking in the second period, old high skilled mimickers and ﬁnally
old low skilled mimickers which are those who chose strategically sm in the
ﬁrst period but turned out to be low skilled also in the second period.
Starting the analysis with the characterization of the eﬃcient interest
income tax rate and denoting by a “tilde” compensated demands, we get:
Proposition 1 When the government maximizes expected utility in the two
income points system the optimal interest income tax rate is implicitly given

























































To interpret (30), notice that the left-hand side of the equation could also
have been written (remember that q = r(1 − t))a st∂e s
∂t,aq u a n t i t yw h i c h
should look familiar since it closely parallels the index of discouragement
originally deﬁned by Mirrlees (1976).
As regards the right-hand side of (30), term labelled C is reminiscent
of the standard self-selection terms appearing in the formulas for optimal
linear commodity taxation when an optimal nonlinear income tax sched-
ule is in place (see e.g. Edwards, Keen and Tuomala, 1994). This kind of
rules prescribe that commodity taxation must be handled as an instrument
to weaken the binding self-selection constraints; moreover, the bigger the
screening power of commodity taxation the larger the scope for its use. The
same holds here for term C since it depends on the diﬀerence between the
level of savings chosen by a “fair” agent and the one chosen by a mimicker.
We recover the standard prescription to tax relatively heavier those com-
modities especially appreciated by a mimicker: if the level of savings of a
mimicker exceeds the one of a “fair” agent, then tax (at a positive rate)
returns to savings; otherwise, subsidize them. In this case, since in order to
maximize his/her expected lifetime utility the mimicker will carry over in
the second period a higher amount of savings, the diﬀerence s − sm will be
negative and term C calls for a positive tax rate on the returns to savings.
According to eq. (30) this is however only part of the story since other
factors, which we are about to analyze, must be taken into account.
To get an intuition for terms labelled D, E and F, remember that in the
two income points system we are forced to oﬀer the same bundle to young
people and old low skilled ones: this means that we cannot move freely By.
The restriction imposed on By (i.e. on the labor income tax schedule) aﬀects
how the other tax instruments which can be levied (in our case the interest
income tax) are shaped. The term in (30) labelled D captures the total
eﬀect on tax revenues that would have followed a marginal increase in By
(starting from By = Bl) if we actually could have done it (without being
forced to move at the same time Bl
o). This total eﬀect is made up by a
direct negative eﬀect on labor income taxes collected (1) and by an indirect
eﬀect on interest income taxes collected coming from the adjustment in the
level of savings (−(r − q) ∂s
∂By |By=Bl). Term labelled E captures the private
welfare gain (normalized by the marginal cost of public funds) potentially
achievable through the increase in By, whereas the last term (labelled F)
evaluates the same increase in terms of the welfare gain (if positive), or loss
(if negative), associated with the eﬀect on the self-selection constraint.
Thus, we have that the second line of (30) will be positive if it is nega-
tive the net social welfare eﬀect descending from the hypothetical marginal
increase of By starting from By = Bl.
Neglecting for a moment term C,w ew o u l dt h e r e f o r eh a v et h a tt h ed i s -
16tortion imposed on the demand for savings should be greater the greater the
net social welfare eﬀect potentially achievable from a hypothetical marginal
increase of By starting from By = Bl; moreover, we would like to discour-
age (encourage) savings if this net social welfare eﬀect is positive (negative).
Notice that since savings are a “commodity” that in principle can both be
demanded and supplied by young agents, discouraging savings would require
t>0 if savings were positive but t<0 if savings were negative. The reverse
holds for the case when we would like to encourage savings.
The appearance of terms labelled D, E and F in (30) can be viewed as
another instance of the general principle that, whenever there are restrictions
on the set of feasible taxes, those taxes which can be levied are adjusted to
serve as partial substitutes for the taxes which cannot be levied.
Turning to the marginal income tax rate faced by the old high skilled
agents is given, we get the following result:
Proposition 2 When the government maximizes expected utility in the two
income points system the marginal (labor) income tax rate T0
o(h) faced by old










































The result provided by (31) is obtained using the deﬁnition of marginal
income tax rate given by (5) to collect terms in (32).
Looking at (27) and (28), we can observe that the result that T0
o(h) is
in general diﬀerent from zero is a consequence of the fact that a marginal
change in Ih
o and a marginal change in Bh
o induce adjustment eﬀects in
the level of savings by young agents which are of diﬀerent scale and which






o , then dividing (27) by (28) we would have got T0
o(h) =0 .
Optimal tax policy imposes a distortion in the labor-leisure choice of old
high skilled agents. Whether they undersupply (T0
o(h) > 0) or oversupply
(T0
o(h) < 0) labor depends on the sign of the budget eﬀect on interest income
tax receipts coming from the adjustment in the level of savings which follows
when old high skilled agents are induced to marginally increase their labor
supply. The total eﬀect on savings is provided by the quantity inside brackets
(multiplied by −1) on the right-hand side of (31). It is given by the sum of
the direct eﬀect coming from a marginal increase in labor supply (−
dcy
dIh
o )a n d
17the indirect eﬀect coming from the increase in disposable income which is







According to condition (31), if the total eﬀect on savings is positive
(dcy < 0) and interest incomes are taxed at a positive rate (t =
r−q
r >
0= ⇒ r − q>0), then revenue collected by taxing the returns to savings
are increased and we should marginally subsidize old high skilled agents to
make them overprovide labor.
Denoting by ds |duh









we would therefore have:
T0
o(h) < 0 if ds |duh
o=0> (<)0 and t > (<)0;
T0
o(h) > 0 if ds |duh
o=0> (<)0 and t < (>)0.
Let’s look now at the total amount of taxes paid by an old high skilled
agent and introduce the concept of marginal eﬀective tax rate (hereafter
METR) as the change in his/her total tax payment that would occur if
he/she were to earn a little more. Denoting the total amount of taxes





















and diﬀerentiating w.r.t. Ih
o to get
the METR which we will denote by τ0
o(h),i ti s :
τ0
o(h) = T0



































Proposition 3 states the main result.
Proposition 3 When the government maximizes expected utility in the two




Proof. The METR can also be written as
τ0h




















The result is obtained substituting for 1 − (r − q)
∂cy
∂Ih
o in (36) the corre-
sponding expression derived adding 1 − πlh on both sides of (32).
18The marginal distortions imposed by labor income taxation and interest
income taxation push in opposite directions as it happened in the atemporal
model for the eﬀects of income and commodity taxation.11 Here, however,
they don’t “average out” to zero. Instead the METR has the same sign as
the marginal labor income tax rate. In some sense, therefore, the distortion
imposed at the margin by the labor income tax is “too high”, or at least too
high to get the usual “no distortion at the top result”. Going back to eq. (31)
allows us to trace the source of such a discrepancy. The basic reason is that
changing the bundle oﬀered to old high skilled agents does not only aﬀect the
total amount of taxes paid by this sub-set of the population but, through the
savings function, it also aﬀects the amount of interest income taxes collected
from the old low skilled individuals.12 This is a direct consequence of the
fact that in our model savings decisions of young agents take place under
conditions of uncertainty about their future skill level and that all young
agents share the same uncertainty, so that savings will be homogeneous and
everybody pays the same amount of interest income taxes in the second
period. Observing that the smaller the relative size of the high skilled group
among old agents the greater the extent of this “external” eﬀect, we can
then understand why in (35) the value of the distortion provided by the
METR is an increasing function of the proportion πll.
Finally, notice that there is actually a quantity that at the optimum
would be unaﬀected if the old high skilled agents were to earn a little more:
the total amount of taxes collected by the government. To show this, deﬁne











+( r − q)s(•) and observe








































the result is straightforward substituting for πlh−(r − q)
∂cy
∂Ih
o in (37) the
right-hand side of (32).
Let’s look now at the low skilled agents. In the two points system young
agents and old low skilled ones are bunched together at the same income
point. At this common point the labor income tax schedule is kinked, but it
is possible to show that there always exists an implementing tax structure
whose left (right)-hand derivative at Il is equal to 1 − MRSI,B for those
with the steepest (ﬂattest) indiﬀerence curves among those who are bunched
11See again Edwards, Keen and Tuomala (1994).
12If this didn’t happen, then in (31) π
lh at the denominator would disappear and we
would recover the standard “end point” result.
19together. In the following Proposition we characterize the implementing tax
structure assuming that savings of young agents are negative. This is in
our model a quite reasonable assumption provided that the value of the
gross rate of return r does not exceed by a too large amount the value of ρ.
Afterwards, we will comment on how results change if the reverse assumption
holds.
Proposition 4 When the government maximizes expected utility and sav-
ings of young agents are negative, the optimal allocation in the two income
points system can be implemented through a labor income tax schedule whose
left-hand- and right-hand derivatives at the common point in the (I,B)-space













































































































































We will come back later, in the analysis of the METRs, to the terms
appearing in (38) and (39). For the moment, just notice that if savings of
young agents had been positive, then we would have had that the left-hand
20derivative of the implementing tax structure at the bunching point was given
by (39) and the right-hand derivative by (38).
Now consider the METRs. Whereas adapting expression (33) provides
a natural way to deﬁne the METR faced by old low skilled agents, it is not
obvious which deﬁnition to use when looking at young agents. Since interest
income taxes are paid when old, the change in the total tax payment of
young agents that would occur if they were to earn a little more depends on
the temporal horizon that we choose. If we focus on the ﬁrst period, then
the change in the total tax payment is simply given by the marginal labor
income tax rate and we already got an expression for it. If instead we take
a lifetime perspective and include also the change in interest income taxes
paid in the second period (which is certain because it does not depend on the
individual’s skill level when old), then something similar to (33) should be
considered. In this case, however, changes in future tax payments should be
discounted by r.U s i n gt h ei m p l i c i td e ﬁnition for the marginal labor income








































Proposition 5 When the government maximizes expected utility in the two
income points system the METRs faced by young agents and old low skilled























































































































































































Eq. (40) and (41) provide analytically complex expressions for the global
distortion faced by the two groups of low skilled agents. Moreover, their signs
remain a priori ambiguous as it appears looking at the sign of each term for
which it was possible to decide on it. Nevertheless, the structure of the for-
mulas can be easily interpreted. Remember that in the standard (timeless)
two types model of optimal taxation the METR faced by the low skilled
agents depends on the diﬀerence between the marginal rate of substitution
for a mimicker and for a mimicked.13 T h es a m eh a p p e n sh e r ew i t ht h eﬁrst
three terms on the r.h.s. of (40) and (41). The diﬀerence is that, whilst
in the timeless version of the model the potential mimicker is unambigu-
ously identiﬁed, here there are more than one potential mimickers: besides
the old high skilled agents, one has also to consider those young choosing
strategically the level of savings (in order to fully exploit the possibility to
mimic in the second period) and those who are low skilled in the second
stage of life but chose strategically the level of savings in the ﬁrst one. This
diﬀerence accounts for the fact that a mimicker and a mimicked are not nec-
essarily people sharing the same disposable income but enjoying diﬀerent
amounts of leisure. Depending on which case we consider, we can alter-
natively have people with diﬀerent disposable income and diﬀerent leisure
(when the mimicker is a high skilled agent), or people with same leisure but
diﬀerent amounts of disposable income (when the mimicker is a low skilled
agent, either young or old).
In eq. (40), the ﬁrst term involves the diﬀerence between MRS
y
I,c and
d MRSI,c. The high skilled mimicker certainly has a lower labor supply but,
13Once again, see Edwards, Keen and Tuomala (1994).
22what about consumption? We know that a young agent will consume Bl−s
whereas the high skilled mimicker will consume Bl + sm (1 + q).W e a l s o
know that sm >sand that, under reasonable assumption, s<0. This means
that, as long as sm < − s
1+q, the consumption of a high skilled mimicker will
be lower than the one of a young agent. If this is the case, then MRS
y
I,c −
d MRSI,c > 0.H o w e v e r ,i fi ti ssm > − s




The second term in (40) involves the diﬀerence between MRS
y
I,c and
d d MRSI,c. Now the mimicker is an old low skilled and therefore mimicker and
mimicked will have the same labor supply. Once again, the consumption of
the mimicker is given by Bl+sm (1 + q) and we can conclude that MRS
y
I,c−
d d MRSI,c > (<)0when sm < (>) − s
1+q.




I,c. The sign of this term is unambiguous since the agents considered
have the same labor supply and two diﬀerent levels of consumption which
can be ranked unambiguously. The consumption of a young mimicker is in
fact Bl − sm which is always smaller than Bl − s since sm >s .F o r t h i s




Turning to eq. (41), the sign of the ﬁrst term depends on that of
MRS
o(l)
I,c − d MRSI,c. The agents that are compared are an old low skilled
and a high skilled mimicker. The labor supply of the high skilled mimicker is
lower than the one of the old low skilled. As regards consumption, the high
skilled mimicker will consume Bl + sm (1 + q) while the old low skilled will
consume Bl + s(1 + q). Therefore, being sm >s , the consumption of the
high skilled mimicker will exceed the one of the old low skilled. A mimicker
will in this case enjoy both a higher level of consumption and a higher level
of leisure and the sign of MRS
o(l)
I,c − d MRSI,c remains ambiguous.
The second term in (41) takes into account the diﬀerence between MRS
o(l)
I,c
and d d MRSI,c, i.e. between an old low skilled who chose s in the ﬁrst pe-
riod and an old low skilled who chose sm. They have the same labor
supply but the old low skilled who chose s consumes less, and therefore
MRS
o(l)
I,c − d d MRSI,c < 0.
The third term in (41) looks at MRS
o(l)
I,c as compared with MRSm
I,c.
Both are low skilled and have the same labor supply but the old low skilled
consumes Bl + s(1 + q) while the young who chooses to save sm consumes
Bl − sm. Since the consumption of the latter will be higher as long as
sm < −s(1 + q), we can conclude that MRS
o(l)
I,c − MRSm
I,c < (>)0 when
sm < (>) − s(1 + q).
As usual, in shaping the tax instruments the policy maker tries to weaken
the self-selection constraint by making the mimicking option less appealing
23and in order to attain incentive-compatibility a distortion is imposed on
those towards whom redistribution is directed. However, since the decision
whether to become a mimicker or not is taken in the ﬁrst period of life,
the expected lifetime pay oﬀ for a mimicker can alternatively be aﬀected
by acting on his/her utility when young, on his/her utility as an old low
skilled, or ﬁnally on his/her utility as an old high skilled. Thus, the ﬁrst
three terms on the r.h.s. of (40) and (41) provide a value for the distortion
which optimally balances these diﬀerent mimicking-discouraging eﬀects.
The fourth terms on the r.h.s. of (40) and (41) are something peculiar
to the “two points” system. They are a direct consequence of the fact that
under this regime people with diﬀerent slopes of the indiﬀerence curves in
the (I,B)-space are oﬀered the same bundle (Il,Bl). If at a given allocation
the slopes are diﬀerent, then it will also be diﬀerent the minimal compen-
sation required to marginally increase labor supply. To give an insight on
how this property can be usefully exploited by the policy maker, let’s take
for instance the expression for the METR faced by young agents. If, as we
previously assumed, savings of young agents are negative, then normality of









I,c means that the compensation required by a young agent
to marginally increase labor supply exceeds the compensation required for
the same purpose by an old low skilled. If this is the case, when young agents
are induced to increase labor supply by moving them along their indiﬀer-
ence curve (i.e. increasing Bl by MRS
y
I,c), the increase in disposable income
makes old low skilled agents better oﬀ (because they would have required
an increase by just MRS
o(l)
I,c ). This increase in utility for old low skilled
agents is both valuable because it increases the value of the maximand of
the government’s problem and because it relaxes the binding self-selection




I,c reﬂects the magni-
tude of this social gain related to the overprovision of labor by young agents.
Other things being equal, the greater this value and the lower the METR
faced by young agents. A symmetric argument holds for the METR faced
by old low skilled agents. In this case, if MRS
y
I,c >M R S
o(l)
I,c , then, other
things being equal, it would pay to increase the METR faced by this group of
people in order to make them underprovide labor. The reason is that, if we
make them marginally increase labor supply holding their utility constant,
t h ei n c r e a s ei nd i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ei sn o ts u ﬃcient to prevent young agents
to be worse oﬀ. This has a double negative eﬀect, since it both decreases
the value of the maximand of the government’s problem and it tightens the
binding self-selection constraint.
The last terms appearing in (40) and (41) are instead related to (bud-
get) eﬀects on interest tax receipts of the same kind of those, previously
described, determining the METR faced by old high skilled agents.
244.2 The Expected Utility Case with a “Three Points” Sys-
tem
When age is observable and the policy maker can use the information on
the correlation between skill and age in order to optimally shape the income


















































































































+(r − q)s(•)=0 . (θ)
By the same argument put forward in the previous case, we can avoid
taking into account the ξ-constraint since we know that at an optimum the
only binding self-selection constraint is the one associated with the Lagrange
multiplier µ.
In the three points system the ﬁrst order conditions referred to the pre-
tax labor income and after-tax labor income for old high skilled and to the
net rate of return on savings formally do not change when compared to
those derived for the two points system, whereas the ﬁrst order conditions
of the government’s problem with respect to the pre-tax labor income and
after-tax labor income for young agents are respectively given by:
25θ
·




































and those for old low skilled agents are:
θ
·










































































Proposition 6 When the government maximizes expected utility in the three





















(s − sm). (46)
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparing Proposition 6 with Proposition 1, we see that, once we re-
move the constraint requiring young and old low skilled agents to be stuck
at the same income point along the labor income tax schedule, the optimal
interest income tax rule exactly mirrors the commodity tax rule of the stan-
dard atemporal version of the two-types mixed taxation model. As long as
the savings behavior of a mimicker diﬀers from the one of a “fair” agent
and starting from a situation where interest incomes are tax-free, a Pareto-
improving reform can be implemented taxing (heavier) the good relatively
more demanded by a mimicker, which in our case happens to be consumption
in the second period, i.e. savings. This implies t =
r−q
r > 0.
The diﬀerence between rules (46) and (30) highlights the fact that, even
if the analytical expressions for the marginal labor income tax rate and
METR faced by old high skilled agents formally do not change when we
switch to a three income points system (it is easy to show that (31) and
(35) are still valid), the actual values of those marginal tax rates are in
fact quite diﬀerent. The magnitude of the global distortion imposed at the
26margin on old high skilled agents is bigger the greater the wedge between
r and q. Thus, other things being equal, the fact whether old high skilled
a r em o r ed i s t o r t e di nt h et w o -o ri nt h et h r e ei n c o m ep o i n t ss y s t e md e p e n d s
on whether the eﬀects of terms C and D − (E + F) reinforce each other or
push in opposite directions.
Let’s look now at the young agents and the old low skilled ones. Propo-
sitions 7 and 8 give the main results.
Proposition 7 When the government maximizes expected utility in the three
income points system the marginal (labor) income tax rate T0
y and the marginal
eﬀective tax rate τ0















































































In the three income points system with observability of age, young agents
cannot be mimicked by old agents. However, since the decision to become
eventually a mimicker in the second period of life is taken in the ﬁrst pe-
riod and aﬀects the savings behavior, a mimicker will be characterized by
a level of savings which deviates from the level intended by the govern-
ment for the young agents. In a certain sense we could also say that there
are actually mimickers also among young agents: those who choose sm in-
stead of s. Not surprisingly, to weaken the binding self-selection constraint
the government should therefore try to make costlier to deviate from s.
Since MRS
y
I,c >M R S m
I,c, this can be accomplished by imposing a posi-











both in (47) and in (48).













in (47) can be explained
referring to the same argument provided in subsection 4.1 to interpret the
marginal income tax rate faced by high skilled agents. It is a budget term, re-
ﬂecting the net eﬀect on receipts from interest income taxation of a marginal
increase in labor supply by young agents.
The term r













in (48) is instead a con-
sequence of the fact that in the deﬁnition of τ0
y we discounted by r the change
27in the amount of interest income taxes the young agents are going to pay














As regards the old low skilled, we have:
Proposition 8 When the government maximizes expected utility in the three
income points system the marginal (labor) income tax rate T0l
o and the marginal
eﬀective tax rate τ0l


























































I,c − d MRSI,c
´


















































To interpret the ﬁrst term appearing both in (49) and (50), remember
that among the old agents there are two types of mimickers: those who
are high skilled but pick the point intended for the old low skilled and
those who are low skilled but chose in the ﬁrst period sm instead of s.T h e
government imposes a distortion on the old low skilled agents trying to lower
the expected pay-oﬀ in the second period for a mimicker and in this way to
relax the binding self-selection constraint. Since MRS
o(l)
I,c − d d MRSI,c < 0,t h e
condition of old low skilled mimicker is worsened by imposing a subsidy at
the margin. On the other hand, the kind of distortion required to hurt a high
skilled mimicker depends on the sign of the diﬀerence MRS
o(l)
I,c − d MRSI,c.A s
we previously noticed, this sign is ambiguous since in this case a mimicker
enjoys both a higher level of consumption and a higher level of leisure.
Eventually the required distortions could push in opposite directions and
then, to determine which one prevails, it becomes important the relative














in (49) is a budget term, reﬂecting
the net eﬀect on receipts from interest income taxation of a marginal increase
28in labor supply by old low skilled agents. It can be interpreted referring to
the same argument put forward in subsection 4.1 when we analyzed the
marginal income tax rate faced by high skilled agents. Other things being
equal, the value of T0l
o will be higher (lower) if an increase in Il
o, accomplished






o, induces adjustments in
the level of savings which decrease (increase) the amount of interest income
taxes collected.
A budget term is also the last in (50). A rationale for this term can be
provided observing that a change in the bundle oﬀered to old low skilled
agents aﬀects also, through the savings function, the amount of interest
income taxes paid by the old high skilled agents. It is only the extent of
this “external” eﬀect that matters for the METR faced by old low skilled
agents. This “external” eﬀect will be stronger the higher the proportion of
high skilled in the old population. That’s why, as πlh approaches zero, the
value of the last term in (50) will also approach zero. The argument is the
exact counterpart of the one exposed in the analysis of the METR faced by
old high skilled agents.
Let’s look now at how the problem changes and the results are aﬀected
if the government aims at maximizing the actual lifetime utility of those
who remain low skilled during the entire life subject to a given value for the
lifetime utility of those who become high skilled, a self-selection constraint
and a budget constraint.
4.3 Case 1: The Actual Lifetime Utility Case with a “Two
Points” System
When in the design of the ﬁscal policy the government is constrained to
oﬀer the same bundle in the (I,B)-space for both the young and the old low

















































14By the same argument used in the sections dealing with the expected utility case we




























































Bl − cy (•)
´
=0 . (θ)










































































































































































































































































































− θ(r − q)
we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime utili-
ties, Pareto eﬃcient interest income taxation in the two income points sys-



































The term Π appearing in (56) measures the eﬀect on the Lagrangian of
the government’s problem coming from a marginal reallocation of consump-
tion of agents across periods, and in particular from a marginal reduction in
the level of savings of young agents. When the objective function of the gov-
ernment entailed maximization of expected utility, we could use the envelope
theorem to conclude that this eﬀect reduced to the budget term −θ(r − q).
This is no longer the case when the government, engaged in Pareto eﬃcient
taxation, aims at maximizing the actual lifetime utility of a given group of
agents. In this setting, the discrepancy between what government maxi-
mizes in selecting the ﬁscal variables and what young agents maximize in
taking their decisions implies that we cannot invoke the envelope theorem to
reduce the total eﬀect to a pure budget eﬀect. Instead, this is also made up
















o .A p a r tf r o mt h i s ,e q .
(56) resembles closely the corresponding one for the expected utility cases,
eq. (30), to which it actually reduces when substituting −θ(r − q) for Π
and taking into account that λ =0in the expected utility case (since we do
not have a “minimum utility level” constraint).
T h ed i s t o r t i o n si m p o s e do nh i g hs k i l l e da g e n t sa r ed e s c r i b e di nP r o p o -
sition 10.
Proposition 10 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime utili-
ties, Pareto eﬃcient taxation in the two income points system implies that





























Even in this case substituting −θ(r − q) for Π is suﬃcient to recover
the corresponding equations for the expected utility case, eq. (31) and (35).
Since the basic mechanisms at work in the two cases are the same, with the
only complication brought about by the limited possibility to exploit the
envelope theorem, considerations close to the ones exposed in the comment
of (31) and (35) can be provided here.
Now consider the point along the income tax schedule where young
agents and old low skilled ones are pooled. As in the expected utility case we
will provide in the following Proposition a result for the implementing tax
structure which holds for the case when savings of young agents are nega-
tive. The same argument put forward in that case applies here to derive the
corresponding result for the case when savings of young agents are positive.
Proposition 11 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime utili-
ties and savings of young agents are negative, the optimal allocation in the
two income points system can be implemented through a labor income tax
schedule whose left-hand- and right-hand derivatives at the common point in





































































































































































Notice again that, substituting −θ(r − q) for Π in (60), and taking into
account that λ =0in the expected utility case, allows us to recover expres-
sion (39). This is instead not suﬃcient in order to obtain (38) from (59). The
formal reason is that at the numerator of term labelled G in (59) we have
1+µπll whereas in the corresponding term of (38) it is (1 + µ)πll = πll+µπll.
Intuitively, this happens because in the actual lifetime utility case the objec-
tive function of the government assigns unitary weight to the utility of old
low skilled agents, whereas in the expected utility case the corresponding
weight is πll.
Looking at the METRs, the following result holds:
Proposition 12 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime utili-
ties, Pareto eﬃcient taxation in the two income points system implies that


































































































































































Once again, substituting −θ(r − q) for Π (and λ =0 ) in (62) we are
back to the corresponding expression for the expected utility case, eq. (41).
Performing this substitutions is not suﬃcient to recover (40) from (61) since
at the numerator of term labelled H in (61) we have 1+µπll whereas in the
corresponding term of (40) it was (1 + µ)πll.
4.4 Case 2: The Actual Lifetime Utility Case with a “Three
Points” System
When the government is free to make the nonlinear income tax schedule



















































































































+(r − q)(By − cy (•)) = 0. (θ)
We have already noticed that switching from the two points system to
the three points system the ﬁrst order conditions referred to the pre-tax
labor income and after-tax labor income for old high skilled and to the net
rate of return on savings do not change formally. As regards the ﬁrst order
conditions of the government’s problem with respect to the pre-tax labor
income and after-tax labor income for young agents and old low skilled












































































































































































































Proposition 13 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime util-
ities, Pareto eﬃcient interest income taxation in the three income points


















(s − sm). (67)
Proof. See Appendix.
Eq. (67) closely parallels eq. (46). The only diﬀerence refers to the
term by which
∂ e cy
∂q is multiplied on the left-hand side. In the expected
utility case the fundamental trade-oﬀ to be faced in considering the optimal
interest income tax rate is that between the desire to discourage mimicking
and the eﬀects on tax revenue. The screening virtues of interest income
taxation can be exploited to implement a compensated marginal change in
q that makes the mimicker worse oﬀ. Since the reform is accomplished in
a compensated way, the expected utility of non mimickers is not aﬀected.
Thus, when the government’s objective function entails maximization of
expected utility, the only side (cost) eﬀect of such a reform is represented by a
budget eﬀect coming from the adjustments in the hicksian demands. Things
are instead diﬀerent when the government aims at maximizing the actual
lifetime utility for those who remain low skilled during the entire life. In that
case the discrepancy between what the government wants to maximize and
what agents actually maximize in taking their consumption/savings decision
implies that the adjustments in the hicksian demands are not welfare neutral
from the government’s perspective. This is the reason why, on the left-hand
side of (67), −Π, a quantity which is made up also by welfare terms, replaces
θ(r − q).
Turning to the old high skilled agents, we have that the formal expres-
sions for the marginal (labor) income tax rate and METR do not change
switching from the two income points system to the three income points sys-
tem. However, as already observed for the expected utility case, this does
not mean that when we move from a system to the other the value of those
tax rates are unaﬀected. This is obvious if we think that the optimal wedges
between gross- and net rate of return to savings required by conditions (56)
and (67) are diﬀerent.
36As regards the young agents and the old low skilled ones, Propositions
14 and 15 provide the relevant results.
Proposition 14 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime utili-
ties, Pareto eﬃcient taxation in the three income points system implies that
the marginal (labor) income tax rate T0
y and the METR τ0





















































































Proposition 15 When the government is maximizing actual lifetime utili-
ties, Pareto eﬃcient taxation in the three income points system implies that
the marginal (labor) income tax rate T0l
o and the METR τ0l
o faced by old low


































































I,c − d MRSI,c
´



















































Notice that it would be suﬃcient to substitute −θ(r − q) for Π in (68),
(69), (70) and (71) in order to recover the corresponding equations derived
for the expected utility case.
375 A Comparison between the Models with and
without Savings
In this Section we would like to call attention to a qualitative diﬀerence
underlying the switch from a two- to a three income points system in a
model without savings and in a model with savings. In a model without
savings, ranking people according to the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves
in the (I,B)-space, the policy maker actually faces two diﬀerent groups of
agents: the low skilled and the high skilled.16,17 This is because within the
low skilled group, at any given point in the (I,B)-space, the indiﬀerence
curve for a young agent has the same slope as the one for an old agent.
With two diﬀerent groups in the population the two income points system
would in this case perform as well as it does the second-best Pareto eﬃcient
allocation of the atemporal Stiglitz (1982) model. In the no-savings case
the possibility to observe age and implement a three income points systems
allows to achieve a Pareto-improvement as it would have happened in the
atemporal model if we had found an exogenous way to identify some of the
low skilled agents and be sure that nobody could try to mimic them.18
Things are instead qualitatively diﬀerent when we analyze the case with
savings. The reason is that, in spite of the assumption of age-independent
preferences, when we allow for the possibility to save, it is no longer true
that, at any given point in the (I,B)-space, the indiﬀerence curves of a young
and of an old low skilled agent are equally sloped. Instead, depending on
the sign of s, if young agents are borrowers or savers, it is possible to predict
which ones will be ﬂatter and which ones steeper. But this in turn means
that in this case the policy maker is actually facing three diﬀerent groups of
people and that it should really try to oﬀer three diﬀerent bundles. Now the
natural counterpart of the atemporal Stiglitz model would be the three in-
come points system where age is not observable but the government exploits
the information on the correlation between skill and age in order to select
three diﬀerent points in the (I,B)-space. Contrary to what happened in the
case without savings, the impossibility to observe age does not prevent the
policy maker doing better by oﬀering three diﬀerent points than by pooling
young and old low skilled agents at the same allocation. In fact, suppose
that the government has, as it is in our model, the information on the joint
distribution of skill and age but it does not use it to try to implement a three
16We have already observed that under reasonable assumptions about the magnitude
of the parameters involved, young agents in our model would like to borrow money. The
model without savings can therefore be interpreted as an extreme version of a model
involving liquidity constraints.
17Notice that this happens because we have assumed preferences that are age-
independent.
18Here the term “exogenous” is used to refer to a case where there is no need of self-
selection devices in order to induce people to reveal their true type.
38income points system. When age is not observable this does not entail any
loss if there are no savings; however, if we introduce savings in the model,
the same attitude would imply that the policy maker is actually not opti-
mizing the use of the information at its disposal, and designing a two income
points system would amount at ineﬃciently constraining the set of feasible
taxes it can impose. Therefore, switching from a two income points system
to the three income points that we have analyzed in this paper (where age
is observable) entails in the case with savings a double gain.
6 Concluding Remarks
The usual atemporal optimal income taxation model has been thoroughly
explored. In this paper we make several important extensions of that model.
We believe it is an important characteristic of real economies that individ-
uals’ income paths widen with age. Some individuals stay low skill all their
life, whereas others are low skill when young but high skill when old. This
means that some individuals are low skill part of their life and high skill
another part of life. This should have implications for how the tax system is
constructed. In this paper we study if it is possible to achieve redistribution
in a more eﬃcient way by making the income tax schedule dependent on
age.
To pursue our analysis we use a simple OLG model where everybody
lives for two periods. In the ﬁrst period everyone is low skilled and ex ante
equal. As individuals age and move into the second period of their lives, a
proportion πlh of the population becomes high skilled whereas the rest stays
low skilled. Individuals maximize expected lifetime utility. The objective
of the policy maker (which can only use annual income as tax base) is to
maximize actual lifetime utility for those who remain low skilled during the
entire life subject to a minimum level of actual lifetime utility for those
who become high skilled in the second period. Thus, there is a discrepancy
between the maximand of the policy maker and that of an individual. We
study two versions of the model. In the simplest we assume that individuals
cannot save. Given this set-up we ﬁnd that if a two points income tax system
is used, the usual result with high skilled being undistorted and low skilled,
both young and old, distorted, facing a positive marginal income tax rate,
is recovered. We show how a strict Pareto improvement can be obtained if
an age dependent three points income tax system is used. Since the young
low skilled cannot be mimicked, the Pareto improvement is accomplished by
oﬀering them a point where they obtain the same utility as before, but where
their consumption/leisure choice is undistorted. This implies that resources
are released so that old low skilled people can be located at a point where
they obtain a higher utility than in the two points income tax system. In
terms of lifetime utilities the expected lifetime utility of individuals has gone
39up. The actual lifetime utility of people being low skilled in both periods
has increased whereas the lifetime utili t yo ft h o s ew h oa r eh i g hs k i l l e di nt h e
second period is unchanged. The changes in consumption and work are as
follows: the old high skilled would perform as before; the young low skilled
would work more and consume more; ﬁnally, the old low skilled would work
less and also have less consumption.
In the second version of the model we assume the economy has access
to the international capital market, implying that individuals can freely
save or dissave at the prevailing rate r. In this case, it turns out to be
convenient to look, as intermediate step, at the case when the government
maximizes the expected utility of agents. The corresponding formulas for
the actual lifetime utility case can then be easily derived (and similarly
interpreted) but are analytically more complex due to the limited possibility
to use the envelope theorem when the maximand of the policy maker and
of an individual diﬀer. In the paper we have characterized both the age
independent and the age dependent income tax systems. Since we consider
the age dependent income tax system more interesting and since it also gives
rise to simpler tax formulas we focus in this summary on the age dependent
tax.
There should be a tax/subsidy on savings. This tax serves the purpose
of deterring mimicking. We regard it as plausible that the mimicker would
save more than a “fair” agent, implying that there should actually be a tax
on interest income. (In the age independent tax system there are also other
aspects that aﬀect how the interest tax should be set.) In contrast to the
case without savings, if individuals have access to the international capital
market, the marginal income tax faced by high skill individuals should be
non-zero. The reason being that a distortion of their labor supply have
budget eﬀects because of the tax on interest income. In contrast also to
results in atemporal models, the eﬀective marginal tax should be non-zero.
This is because of an eﬀect that only arises in an intertemporal model with
savings. Changing the bundle oﬀered to old high skilled agents does not only
aﬀect the total amount of taxes paid by this sub-set of the population but,
through the savings function, it also aﬀects the amount of interest income
taxes collected from the old low skilled individuals.
The result that young people should be undistorted is also modiﬁed
when savings is a possibility. The reasons are not the same, but similar
to the reasons why old high skilled should be distorted. Finally, old low
skilled should be distorted. There are several reasons for this. First, there
is the reason that “classical” mimicking should be deterred. An old high
skill person should not prefer the income/tax point intended for an old low
skill. Second, in the expression for the eﬀective marginal tax for old low skill
individuals there are also terms due to deterrence of mimicking in terms of
savings behavior. Third, there is a budget term which is the counterpart
of the budget term appearing in the formula for the eﬀective marginal tax
40rate faced by the high skilled agents: altering the bundle oﬀered to old low
skilled agents does not only aﬀect the total amount of taxes paid by this
sub-set of the population but it also aﬀects the amount of interest income
taxes collected from the high skilled individuals.
We have characterized an optimal age dependent tax both under the
assumption that individuals cannot save and allowing for the possibility to
save. What is the most policy relevant case? This is in the end an empirical
question. However, given that the expected income in the second period
is higher than the income when young, individuals would probably like to
borrow when young and pay back when old. In such a situation individuals
would be unable to borrow when young. Hence, the case where individuals
cannot save might be the most relevant one.
The model we have studied in this paper is quite abstract, as are many
optimal tax models, and the results obtained cannot be directly applied in
the design of tax systems. However, we have shown that there is scope for
using age-dependent taxes to increase the eﬃciency of redistributive ﬁscal
policies. To obtain more detailed insights in how these tax systems should
be designed we believe simulation studies, like those originally performed
by Mirrlees (1971) in his atemporal model, would be useful. Further, an
important issue left unexplored in this paper is how educational incentives
would be aﬀected by an age dependent income tax. (Kremer (2002) contains
an informal discussion of this topic.)
There may be further arguments than that developed here for using
an age dependent income tax. For example, preferences for leisure might
vary with age, which implies that even if there were no correlation between
average skill level and age, there might still be gains from an age dependent
tax.
417A p p e n d i x
7.1 Fig. 2-5.
Fig. 2
Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high
skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not implementable
since the old high skilled would like to mimic the old low skilled and the
self-selection constraint is violated.
Fig. 3
42Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high
skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not optimal since
moving the old low skilled from point D to point C increases the revenue
collected by the government without violating any self-selection constraints.
Fig. 4
Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high
skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not optimal since
moving the young from point C to point D increases the revenue collected by
the government and slackens the binding self-selection constraint preventing
old high skilled to mimic young agents.
Fig. 5
43Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high
skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not implementable
since the old high skilled would like to mimic the old low skilled and the
self-selection constraint is violated as it happened in ﬁg. 2.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Rearranging f.o.c. (26) and (28), we have:
θ(r − q)
∂cy







































o = −θπlh + πlh





Taking into account that in the two income points system Bl
o = By = Bl

























































































Summing up (72) and (73), and multiplying all terms by s,w ec a no b t a i n





































































o=Bl, we can derive from (75) an










that can be substituted for the
corresponding term in (74). Simplifying and collecting terms gives eq. (30).
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4











































































Dividing (76) by (77) and multiplying the result by the expression on
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The assumption of normality of all goods in the economy implies that,
when savings of young agents are negative, the young agents have indiﬀer-
ence curves in the (I,B)-space which are steeper than the ones for old low
skilled agents. We also know that at a bunching point there exists an im-
plementing tax structure whose left-hand derivative is equal to 1−MRS of
those agents with the highest level of MRS among those who are pooled;
since in this particular case the young agents are those with the highest
value of the marginal rate of substitution, this means that it will exist an
implementing tax structure at the bunching point Il whose left-hand deriva-




∂cy . Eq. (38) is then obtained from (79) dividing

















































































45Dividing (80) by (81) and multiplying the result by the expression on
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Since we know that at a bunching point there exists an implementing tax
structure whose right-hand derivative is equal to 1 − MRS of those agents
with the lowest level of MRS among those who are pooled, which in our case
are the old low skilled agents, there will exist an implementing tax structure












7.4 Proof of Proposition 5

























∂cy derived from (79) and
collecting terms gives eq. (40).
The METR faced by old low skilled agents is instead given by:
τ0
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∂Bl − 1
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o derived from (83) and
collecting terms gives eq. (41).
467.5 Proof of Proposition 6
































Taking into account that in the three income points system term labelled
L in (74) reduces to
∂cy
∂Bl










to be substituted in (74). Simplifying and collecting
terms gives eq. (46).
7.6 Proof of Proposition 7






































































Eq. (47) is obtained from the equation above dividing both sides by θ
a n dt h e nu s i n gt h ei m p l i c i td e ﬁnition of the marginal labor income tax rate





∂cy ) to collect terms.
In the three income points system the expression for the METR faced



























∂cy given by (47) and collecting terms provides eq. (48).
477.7 Proof of Proposition 8































































































































Eq. (49) is obtained from the equation above dividing both sides by θ
a n dt h e nu s i n gt h ei m p l i c i td e ﬁnition of the marginal labor income tax rate









o ) to collect terms.
In the three income points system the expression for the METR faced
by old low skilled agents becomes:
τ0l





























o given by (49) and collecting terms provides eq. (50).
7.8 Proof of Proposition 9
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In the two income points system and using the Slutsky-type decomposi-


















































Summing up (93) and (94), and multiplying the result by s allows to get










which can be substituted in (95).
Simplifying and collecting terms gives condition (56).
7.9 Proof of Proposition 10
F.o.c. (53) and (54) can be rewritten in a more compact way as
∂cy
∂Ih






















Dividing (96) by (97) and multiplying by
∂cy
∂Bh


















































Eq. (57) is obtained from eq. (99) using the deﬁnition of marginal
income tax rate given by (5).
To get eq. (58) multiply both sides of (99) by
r−q
Π : this gives an ex-




































substituted in the deﬁnition of the METR (see (34)), gives the result.
7.10 Proof of Proposition 11











































































Then proceed exactly as in the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4




∂cy , which, for the same reasons provided
there, gives again the value of the left-hand derivative at the bunching point
Il for one of the possible implementing tax structures.











































































Then, proceed as in the second part of the proof of Proposition 4 to derive







o . The same kind of remarks provided there can
be used here to show that there exists an implementing tax structure whose








7.11 Proof of Proposition 12
The deﬁnitions of the METRs faced by young and old low skilled agents in
the two income points system are always those respectively given by (84)












o respectively given by (59) and (60)
and then collecting terms.
7.12 Proof of Proposition 13






























In the three income points system and using the Slutsky-type decompo-



















































50Summing up (100) and (94) and multiplying the result by s allows to









which can be substituted in (101).
Simplifying and collecting terms gives condition (67).
7.13 Proof of Proposition 14
































































∂cy . By the implicit deﬁnition of the marginal labor





∂cy )t h i se x p r e s s i o n
will provide the value of T0
y given by (68).
The deﬁnition of the METR faced by the young agents in the three in-
come points system is always the one given by (89). Eq. (69) is obtained




∂cy given by (68) and then col-
lecting terms.
7.14 Proof of Proposition 15



























































































































o . By the implicit deﬁnition of the marginal labor income









o )t h i se x p r e s s i o n
will provide the value of T0l
o given by (70).
The deﬁnition of the METR faced by the old low skilled agents in the
three income points system is always the one given by (88). Eq. (71) is








o given by (70) and
then collecting terms.
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